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Abstract:  We provide a detailed accounting of the trend increase in family income volatility in 
recent decades by quantifying the contributions of household head earnings, spouse earnings, 
non-transfer non-labor income, transfer income, and tax payments (inclusive of the refundable 
Earned Income Tax Credit), along with covariances among the income components.  Using two-
year matched panels in the Current Population Survey from 1980 to 2009, we find that the 
volatility of family income, as measured by the variance of the arc percent change, doubled over 
the past three decades.  The increase in volatility was most pronounced among the top 1% of the 
income distribution; however, in any given year the level of volatility among the bottom 10% 
exceeds that of the top. The variance decompositions indicate that increased family income 
volatility comes directly from the higher volatility of head and spouse earnings, and other 
nonlabor income, as well as from substantially reduced covariance between these three income 
sources with the tax system.  This suggests that the current tax code is less effective in mitigating 
income shocks than in previous decades.  Among lower income households, a larger share of 
volatility is driven by transfer income.  In the absence of the increased negative covariance 
between the volatility of head earnings with non-transfer other income, overall volatility would 
be much higher.   
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By most accounts income volatility for the typical family in the United States has been on 
the rise since the early 1970s, with estimates ranging from 10 percent to a doubling (Gundersen 
and Ziliak 2003; Dynan, et al. 2008; Hacker and Jacobs 2008; Gottschalk and Moffitt 2009; 
Winship 2009; Dahl, Deleire, and Schwabish 2011).  Understanding the sources of rising 
volatility is important because of the possibility that changes in labor supply and public policies 
may have shifted more idiosyncratic and business cycle risk onto families, which could have 
negative welfare consequences if it falls predominantly on those that face liquidity constraints 
and are less able smooth income shocks (Kniesner and Ziliak 2002; Blundell, et al. 2008; Hacker 
and Jacobs 2008; Gottschalk and Moffitt 2009; Parker and Vissing-Jorgenson 2009).  Our aim in 
this paper is to provide a detailed accounting of the trend increase in family income volatility by 
quantifying the contributions of household head earnings, spouse earnings, non-transfer non-
labor income, transfer income, and tax payments (inclusive of the refundable Earned Income Tax 
Credit), along with covariances among the income components. 
The initial interest in volatility among labor economists focused on earnings of male 
heads of household in an effort to better understand whether the rise in wage inequality 
represented temporary shifts or structural changes in the labor market (Gottschalk and Moffitt 
1994; Haider 2001). This spawned a series of additional studies, with the consensus being that 
earnings instability among men peaked in the 1980s and stabilized thereafter (Dynarski and 
Gruber 1997; Keys 2008; Shin and Solon 2008; Celik, et al. 2009; Dahl, DeLeire, and Schwabish 
2011; Ziliak, Hardy, and Bollinger 2011).  The earnings instability of women also stabilized in 
the late 1980s, but unlike men, actually fell from peaks in the early 1970s as more women 
entered full time employment.  Not well known, however, is whether there have been changes in 
the correlation of earnings shocks between husbands and wives that might contribute to the trend 
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rise in income volatility. The canonical added worker hypothesis (Lundeberg 1985) stipulates 
that earnings shocks of husbands and wives are negatively correlated—a fall in husband earnings 
due to unemployment is offset by a rise in earnings of the wife—but if there is assortative 
matching in the marriage market and both spouses work in similar industries/occupations then it 
is possible that earnings shocks are positively correlated (Shimer and Smith 2000).  If the added-
worker phenomenon dominates then spousal labor supply should attenuate trends in income 
volatility, while if assortative matching dominates then we might expect volatility exacerbated.  
In addition to secular changes in labor supply of families, there have been dramatic 
changes to the U.S. tax and transfer system. For example, in 1996 the most fundamental reform 
to the U.S. welfare system was passed, and it in conjunction with expansions in the EITC in 
1993, led to dramatic increases in the labor supply of low-skilled single mothers (Meyer and 
Rosenbaum 2001).  However, because of the clawback in welfare benefits after the reform, due 
both to mechanical responses (because benefits are means-tested and thus fall with rises in 
earnings) and behavioral responses, the level of after-tax income after welfare reform actually 
fell (Bollinger, Gonzalez, and Ziliak 2009). With restricted access to the safety net it is possible 
that these families face greater income risk, especially during the recessions of 2001 and 2008.   
At the other end of the distribution, the tax reforms of the 1980s greatly reduced marginal 
tax rates among high-income families. Ziliak and Kniesner (2002) showed that these reforms 
reduced implicit income and consumption insurance to families.  That is, the more progressive 
the tax system the smaller the decline in after-tax income when before-tax income falls, and thus 
the move to a flatter tax system resulted in reduced implicit insurance and greater ex ante after-
tax income risk among high-income families.  Indeed, Parker and Vissing-Jorgenson (2009, 
2010) found that the cyclicality of incomes at the top of the income distribution far surpassed 
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that facing the typical household, leading Frank (2011) to characterize this trend as “the wild ride 
of the 1%.”  The Parker and Vissing-Jorgenson result that cyclicality at the top of the distribution 
dominates that of the typical family assuages concerns over negative welfare consequences of 
volatility assuming that liquidity constraints are not binding at the top, but their use of tax return 
data does not allow a detailed analysis of lower-income households because many do not file 
returns. It thus remains an open question whether the volatility at the top exceeds that at the 
bottom, and one that we address. The combination of welfare reform and tax reform suggests 
that examining changes in volatility sources across the income distribution is important. 
In order isolate whether rising after-tax income volatility is explained by an increase in 
the variance of earnings on the one hand, or a (absolute value) decrease in the covariance of 
earnings and tax payments on the other hand, we employ a variance decomposition of income 
volatility into its component parts of spousal earnings, transfer income, other non-transfer 
income, less net tax payments.1  A key advantage of the variance is that once we weight each of 
the income components by their respective shares in (two-year) average income, total volatility is 
the sum of the volatility of the individual income sources plus the covariances across sources. 
For our measure of volatility we use the arc percent change in income, which is advantageous 
over the point percent change because it is symmetric, it is more robust to large swings in 
incomes, and it easily admits zero (or negative) incomes.  
In constructing the weighted variance of the arc percent change we treat the individual 
income shares and volatility terms as random variables, and use the exact decomposition 
techniques of Bohrnstedt and Goldberger (1969) for the products of random variables. We also 
                                                 
1 Our study is most similar to Dynan, et al. (2008), who examine trends in earnings, cash transfers, and other 
nonlabor income using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.  Our paper differs in that we examine both 
the variances and the covariances across income sources via our exact variance decomposition, we include taxes and 
in-kinds transfers, and we use much larger CPS data to analyze volatility across the distribution. 
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differ from the literature by exploiting a little used feature of the Current Population Survey 
(CPS) that permits linking of the same individual across annual waves to create a series of two-
year panels (Gittleman and Joyce 1996; Cameron and Tracy 1998; Ziliak, Hardy, Bollinger 
2011).  The advantage of the CPS relative to datasets such as the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics is the large sample sizes that permit more robust examination of trends across the 
distribution.  The CPS is also the workhorse dataset for research on income inequality, and since 
volatility is a potential contributor to inequality, it is useful to examine volatility in the CPS.  
Our results show that overall family income volatility more than doubled from 1980 to 
2009, and while the increase in volatility was most pronounced among the top 1% of the income 
distribution, in any given year the level of volatility among the bottom 10% exceeds that of the 
top, suggesting the potential for substantial welfare losses among the poor facing liquidity 
constraints.  Overall, the variance decomposition indicates that increased family income 
volatility comes directly from the higher volatility of head and spouse earnings, other income, 
and a reduced covariance between these three income sources with the tax system, suggesting 
that the current tax code is less effective today in mitigating income shocks.  We present 
evidence that after 1990 the covariance of spousal earnings switched from negative (or zero) to 
positive, consistent with assortative matching, and that leads to modest upward pressure on 
overall income volatility. Although transfers intercede to dampen family earnings volatility 
among lower income households, there is less smoothing from this source in recent years.  
Decomposition analysis also shows volatility among higher income families is driven by 
earnings and other income, and that within this relationship, an increasing covariance between 
earnings and other income occurs – suggesting other income offsets earnings shocks in a way 
similar to the tax system.   
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II. A Decomposition of Income Volatility 
In modeling the extent to which disposable incomes fluctuate from one year to the next, 
and the attendant channels that generate those fluctuations, we highlight five sources of income 
for a family: the wages of the head (h), the wages of the spouse (s), non-transfer other income 
(o), transfer income (tr), and tax payments (tx).  This leads to a specification of disposable family 
income for family i in time t as 
(1) , 
where the first four terms are generally positive and expand family resources, while taxes reduce 
resources.  We note, though, that with refundable credits such as the EITC tax payments may be 
negative, and thus resulting in higher after-tax income than before-tax. 
We measure disposable income volatility, , as the variance of the arc percent change  
(2) , 
where 	  is the variance operator, and  is the person-specific time mean across the 
pair of years.2  The use of the time-mean in the denominator helps reduce the influence of 
extreme swings of income across years, and with the added feature that this measure is 
symmetric and bounded below by -200 percent and above by +200 percent.  Dynan, et al. (2008), 
Dahl, et al. (2011), and Ziliak, et al. (2011) measure volatility with the standard deviation of the 
arc percent change. We use the variance because it is additively separable in subcomponents 
whereas the standard deviation is not.     
                                                 
2 In a sensitivity analysis where negative incomes are permitted owing to business losses we use the absolute value 
of income in time t and t-1.  The volatility measure in equation (2) still retains its symmetry property in this case. 
We find that including negatives has negligible impacts on the trend in disposable income volatility, so we do not 
show trends including negative values. In addition, we note that it is possible for a person to have income that is 
equal but opposite in sign across years, and instead of averaging to zero our measure reports the average as the 
absolute value of one of the years.  In practice we find that this is not an issue and we do not lose any observations.  
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To identify the contribution of each income source to total volatility, we apply the arc 
percent change to equation (1) as  
(3) , 
where the arc percent change of each income source is weighted by its share of mean income 
across each pair of two years. Taking the variance of both sides results in 
(4) ∑ ∑ ∑ , , 
where the left hand side is total volatility as in equation (2),   is the share of component j 
income to the total,  is the arc percent change, and j = h, s, o, tr, and tx 
(corresponding to 1,..,5 in the summation).  Equation (4) implies total volatility consists of five 
variance terms (V(.)) and ten unique covariance terms (C(.)).  We treat both  and  as random 
variables, and use results of Borhnstedt and Goldberger (1969) to compute exact variances and 
covariances of the product of random variables as 
(5) ∆ ∆  
                               2 ∆ ∆ 2 ∆ ∆  
                               2 , ,  
and 
(6) , , ,  
                                         , ,  
                                         ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆  
                                       	 ∆ ∆ ∆ 	 ∆ ∆ ∆  
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                                       	 ∆ ∆ ∆ , , , 
where ∆ ̅ is the deviation from mean for , ), and E( ) is the expectations 
operator.  This decomposition implies that family income changes can arise directly from one of 
the five sources, or from the covariances of the income sources.  For example, if husband and 
wife labor supply decisions are substitutes, then a negative shock to head’s earnings could result 
in an offsetting increase in the volatility of wife earnings, leaving total volatility of the family 
little changed.  Below we calculate total volatility and the contribution of the 15 variances and 
covariances for each year over the past three decades.   
 
III. Data 
 The economic and demographic information on families comes from the Annual Social 
and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS) for calendar years 1980-2009 
(interview years 1981-2010).  With the exceptions of Dahl, et al. (2011) and Parker and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2009, 2010), the literature on income volatility has relied exclusively on longitudinal 
data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).  The PSID is the longest running panel 
of families available, and is well suited for research on volatility, but the survey was redesigned 
in 1992 and 1993, and thus papers using the PSID have arrived at different results depending on 
how they handle the redesign years.  Another reason for different results from PSID-based 
papers is with the treatment of families reporting zero earnings or income.  Because much of the 
literature reports the variance of log earnings or income, person-years with zero earnings/income 
are dropped from the analysis, which can understate measured volatility because labor-force 
dropouts are ignored.  Although as noted below we observe at most one-half of the CPS sample 
across two-years, this is sufficient for our arc percent change volatility measure, and given the 
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large samples in the CPS, we are able to estimate income volatility trends with precision for 
detailed subgroups, as well as across the income distribution. 
Our sample consists of family heads ages 25 to 60, where a family is defined as two or 
more persons related by birth, marriage, or adoption.   As specified in equation (1) the focal 
variable is disposable income, which is the sum of head and spouse earnings, non-transfer other 
income, transfer income, less net tax payments.  Earnings of the head (and spouse if present) is 
defined as the sum of wage and salary income, non-farm self employment, and farm self 
employment.  Other non-transfer income consists of labor income of other relatives beside the 
head or spouse; rent, interest, and dividends; alimony; child support; private pensions; and gift 
income.3  Transfer income consists of Social Security and Disability Insurance; Supplemental 
Security Income; Unemployment Insurance; Workers Compensation; Veterans Payments; Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (and after 1996, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families); 
General Assistance; food assistance such as food stamps (called Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program after 2008) along with school breakfast and lunch; and housing assistance 
from public housing and Section 8 vouchers.  Tax payments are the sum of federal, state, and 
payroll taxes that are estimated for each family in each year using the NBER TAXSIM program 
in conjunction with basic information on labor income, taxable nonlabor income, dependents, 
and certain deductions such as property tax payments and child care expenses.4  The federal and 
state taxes include the respective EITC code for each tax year and state, thus allowing for the 
possibility of negative tax payments.  We assume that the family bears only the employee share 
                                                 
3 As a sensitivity check, we also conduct the volatility analyses with simulated data on capital gains produced by the 
Census Bureau.  The measure was discontinued as of 2010 due to data irregularities and poor quality.  The general 
trends and results are not significantly affected by its inclusion.   
4 The CPS does not have information on certain inputs to the TAXSIM program such as annual rental payments, 
child care expenses, or other itemized deductions.  We set these values to zero when calculating the tax liability.. 
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of the payroll tax rate. Unless noted otherwise all income data are deflated by the Personal 
Consumption Expenditure Deflator with 2009 base year.   
The CPS employs a rotating survey design so that a respondent is in sample for 4 months, 
out 8 months, and in another 4 months.  This makes it possible to match approximately one-half 
of the sample from one March interview to the next.  Following the recommended Census 
procedure we perform an initial match of individuals on the basis of five variables: month in 
sample (months 1-4 for year 1, months 5-8 for year 2); gender; line number (unique person 
identifier); household identifier; and household number.  We then cross check the initial match 
on three additional criteria: race, state of residence, and age of the individual.  If the race or state 
of residence of the person changed we delete that observation, and if the age of the person falls 
or if it increases by more than two years (owing to the staggered timing of the initial and final 
interviews), then we delete those observations on the assumption that they were bad matches.   
Prior to matching across years, we delete those observations with imputed income as 
recommended by Bollinger and Hirsch (2006), and we adopt the consistent set of income top 
codes constructed by Larrimore, et al. (2009) to mitigate the influence of changes in Census top 
code procedures starting in the mid 1990s.  Burkhauser, et al. (2012) find that using the 
consistent top code method results in CPS measures of income inequality tracking those from 
proprietary tax return data better than (unadjusted) public-use CPS data, and Ziliak, et al. (2011) 
find the use of the consistent top codes to be important in documenting trends in earnings 
volatility.  There were major survey redesigns in the mid 1980s and mid 1990s so it is not 
possible to match across the 1985-1986 waves and the 1995-1996 waves.  This yields an 
interrupted time series across 29 years with gaps in calendar years 1984-1985 and 1994-1995. As 
indicated in Appendix Table 1, we have 14,466 observations in an average year when a match is 
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possible, for a total of 433,981 matches.  Appendix Table 1 also summarizes the number and rate 
of matches for each year, indicating that we match approximately 49 percent across survey years 
on average.  The declining match rate after the mid 1990s reflects in part a rise in allocation 
within the CPS after adoption of CATI-CAPI interviewing.  In results not tabulated, if we retain 
individuals with allocated earnings and income then we match just over 62 percent across years.  
A possible concern with declining match rates is with sample attrition affecting our 
volatility series. Under the assumption that the probability of attrition is unobserved and time 
invariant (i.e., a fixed effect), then differencing the variable will remove the latent effect (Ziliak 
and Kniesner 1998; Wooldridge 2001).  If there is a time-varying factor loading on the 
unobserved heterogeneity then differencing will not eliminate potential attrition bias, though if 
the loading changes slowly over time then differencing will mostly eliminate bias.  A 
conservative interpretation, then, is that data from matched CPS provides estimates of volatility 
among the population of non-movers.  Even if this is true it is still not clear a priori whether 
potential time-varying attrition affects overall trends in volatility as moves can be accompanied 
by downward or upward movements in income, or no change at all.  Our measure of volatility 
described above involves first differencing income, and thus under the maintained assumption 
that attrition is person-specific and time invariant, we believe potential attrition bias will be 
attenuated.   
For most of our analyses we restrict attention to family heads with nonnegative 
disposable incomes, resulting in a reduced pooled sample size of 238,275.  This means that in 
our baseline series we include families with zero disposable income, which is possible if taxes 
exactly offset income, or more likely, if the family depends on non family members such as a 
cohabiting partner for support.  There are 1,300 observations, or 0.55 percent of stable family 
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heads, that report zero income in one of the two years, and 151 heads, or 0.06 percent, that report 
zero disposable income in both years.  The arc percent change measure of volatility 
accommodates zero income in one of the periods with no adjustment necessary, but when 
income is zero in both years, the arc percent change is not defined.  Because ‘volatility’ in 
practice is zero when income is zero both years, we retain these observations and set volatility to 
zero. 5  In all cases the family head is restricted to be the same across years, and for the 
subsamples of married couples and female heads, the additional restriction of constant marital 
status is imposed. Basic summary statistics are provided in Appendix Table 2. 
 
IV. Trends in Income Volatility 
 We begin in Figure 1 by presenting the trend in after-tax income volatility across all 
families (i.e. the series represented by the ‘♦’).  In any given year, the figure presents the year 2 
value of volatility so that 1981 refers to families matched across 1980 and 1981, 1982 refers to 
1981-1982 matches, and so on.  The figure shows a strong secular rise in income volatility, 
which peaked in 2001, and subsequently stabilized for the remainder of the last decade.  By 2009 
income volatility increased 108 percent since the early 1980s, suggesting much heightened 
instability facing the average American family. 
[Figure 1 here] 
In the figure we examine the sensitivity of our volatility trend to excluding zeros, 
including capital gains and losses, and including an adjustment factor for higher income families.   
Figure 1 shows that when we drop observations with zero income in one (or both) years, the 
level of volatility falls in every year, and the trend increase is lower but still a substantial 78 
                                                 
5 Blank (2012) also discusses the issue of zero family income in the March CPS and comes to a similar conclusion 
that these are legitimate observations and retains them in her analysis. 
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percent increase.  On the other hand, when we include the simulated values of capital gains and 
losses computed each year starting in 1980 by the Census Bureau (but eliminated in 2009), the 
level of volatility is slightly higher and trend increase nearly identical to the base case (102 
percent increase).  Finally, we estimate trend volatility with an additional adjustment factor over 
and above the Larrimore, et al. (2009) consistent top code that accounts for the censoring of top 
incomes within the CPS.  This interpolation technique, based on the Pareto distribution (Piketty 
and Saez 2003), does not affect either the level or trend of our main volatility series in Figure 1.   
[Figure 2 here] 
Figure 2 demonstrates that the rise in disposable income volatility cuts across race and 
family structure.  In any given year, the volatility of families headed by black person, or families 
headed by a single mother, are substantively higher than the volatility among white families or 
married families.  However, the rise in volatility among white families and married families was 
actually larger (112% and 134%, respectively) than the other two groups (79% and 62%, 
respectively).  Because the trends are common across major demographics groups, for ease of 
presentation in most of the ensuing analysis we focus our discussion on the pooled sample of all 
families unless otherwise noted.    
  In Figures 3 and 4 we examine the underlying components of rising disposable income 
volatility based on the decomposition in equations (4)-(6).  Figure 3 presents the five weighted 
variance terms from equation (5), along with the total volatility among all families from Figure 
1.  We see here that the level of volatility in any given year is strongly influenced by the 
volatility of head and spouse earnings, as well as non-transfer other income.  However, volatility 
increased across all variance components, rising about 87 and 84 percent respectively for head 
and spouse earnings, 55 percent for other income, about 20 percent among tax payments.  
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Although the level is low, transfer payment volatility increased 160 percent, especially in the last 
few years with the onset of the Great Recession.   
[Figures 3 and 4 here] 
In Figure 4 we depict the ten weighted covariance terms based on the formula in equation 
(6).  It is important to recall that these are not covariances across levels of income sources, but 
rather the covariance of income volatilities.  Covariances that are positive, or that become less 
negative from one year to the next, lead to upward pressure on total volatility, while those that 
are negative or become less positive from one year to the next put downward pressure on total 
volatility.   
Figure 4 shows that in the first half of the sample period the covariance of head and 
spouse earnings volatility was negative, or zero, whereas over the past decade it has become 
positive (i.e. the series represented by the ‘♦’).  This suggests that husbands and wives now have 
positively correlated earnings shocks, which makes it more difficult to smooth family income 
volatility.  At the same time, Figures 3 and 4 make clear the importance of the tax code in 
smoothing income shocks.  For example, as head and spouse earnings volatilities were peaking 
in the 2000-2001 period, the negative covariances of head wages with taxes (the series 
represented by the ‘ ’), coupled with the negative covariance of spouse wages with taxes (the 
‘+’ series), attenuated substantially the growth in total volatility.  Whereas the tax system appears 
to be fairly responsive in mitigating volatility from earnings and other income sources, the 
covariances between head or spouse earnings with transfers has been little changed over the three 
decades (the ‘ ’ and ‘∘’).  Indeed, aside from the tax system, over the past decade total family 
income volatility was largely kept in check by the growing negative covariance of other non-
transfer income volatility with earnings volatility of the head (the ‘∎’ series).   
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[Table 1 here] 
To further illuminate the changing roles of the various income sources over time, in 
Table 1 we present the share of each of the 15 components in the weighted variance-covariance 
decomposition to total volatility (along with the estimated total variance in the first column).  
Table 1 corresponds directly to Figures 3 and 4, but for brevity we tabulate results for every 
fourth year of the sample (except 1985 which, as described in the Data section, is missing).  Each 
row in the table sums to 1.  Comparing the shares in 1981 to those in 2009 in Table 1 we see that 
in 2009 even though volatility is double, the share from the variance of both head and spouse 
wages fell, as did that of other non-transfer income and taxes, while the share from the variance 
of transfers rose modestly.  This suggests that the largest upward pressure came from the 
(absolute value) reduction in the shares from the covariance of the tax system with earnings and 
other income.  That is, the covariance terms of taxes in Figure 4 are larger in absolute value in 
2009 than in 1981, but as a share of the total it has declined.  Indeed, with the exception of 2009, 
for most of the past decade the tax code reduced income volatility just under 19 percent, while in 
the 1980s it lowered it by almost 22 percent. This is consistent with the results of Kniesner and 
Ziliak (2002) who showed that the tax code prior to the Reagan tax cuts of the 1980s offered 
more implicit insurance against income shocks. 
[Table 2 here] 
Because Table 1 (and Figures 3 and 4) pools married and unmarried heads of household, 
the covariances of head and spouse income are muted as it contains zeros for those with no 
spouse.  In Table 2 we isolate married heads of household where it is clear that we are better able 
to capture the covariation of spousal income. In 1981 the covariance of husband and wife 
volatility was -0.03, suggesting that earnings shocks were offsetting as suggested by the added 
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worker hypothesis, but within a decade the covariance was positive, rising to +0.04 by 2001, and 
remained above 0 for the remainder of the sample period.  The positive covariance is consistent 
with assortative matching in the marriage and labor markets. Moreover, in Table 2 we see that 
among married families the weighted variance of head earnings exceeds that of the family 
overall, and thus there is a greater role of the tax system in any given year to reduce volatility.  
Again, however, the share of the covariance between head wages and taxes fell more than the 
head’s wage variance, so that the share declined in absolute value resulting in higher volatility 
overall for married couples (this also came from a substantial decline on the covariance of 
volatility of other income and taxes).  
  
V. Volatility across the Distribution 
In this section we examine what, if any, differences emerge in the relative contribution of 
earnings, taxes, transfers, and non labor income to family income volatility across income level.  
As noted in the Introduction, income instability may have non-negligible welfare consequences 
among households facing liquidity constraints or other barriers to their ability to absorb 
unanticipated shocks.  By looking across the distribution of family incomes, we can determine 
what differences in exposure to income volatility exist, and the extent to which this exposure has 
shifted over time.   
Figure 5 depicts trends in disposable income volatility as a function of location in the 
initial year disposable income distribution.  Specifically, we place families into one of 8 mutually 
exclusive categories of initial year disposable income: being in the bottom 1% of the distribution, 
between the 1st and 10th percentiles of the distribution, the 10th and 25th percentiles, the 25th and 
50th percentiles, the 50th and 75th percentiles, the 75th and 90th percentiles, the 90th and 99th 
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percentiles, and lastly in the top 1%.  We then compute volatility among those families in each 
category.  It is important to recognize that income volatility may push families into a higher or 
lower category in the second year, but for the purpose of this exercise they are placed in the 
income category of the first year. 
[Figure 5 here] 
As seen in Figure 5, volatility increased across the distribution over the past few decades, 
ranging from a 50 percent increase among the bottom 1% to a 185 percent increase among the 
top 1%.  There is little doubt that the top 1% has experienced substantial upward volatility in 
recent decades, but this is swamped by the extreme short-term volatility of the bottom 1%, and 
indeed the bottom 10%.  For example, from 1996 to 2009 volatility among the bottom 1% rose 
by 50 percent, and there was an astounding 5-fold increase between 2006 and 2007.  Because of 
small samples, the bottom 1% volatility will be susceptible to outliers.  However, among the 
much larger population in the bottom 10% there is less evidence of year-to-year swings, but in 
any given year since 1996 the level of volatility among the bottom 10% was 59 percent higher 
than the volatility among the top 1%, and this level nearly doubled since 1981.6 
[Table 3 here] 
 In Table 3 we present the variance decomposition of equations (5) and (6) for the 8 
different segments of the income distribution.  Instead of presenting 16 figures (two for each 
segment of the distribution akin to Figures 3 and 4), we just present the decomposition for each 
of four years—two business-cycle peak years (1989 and 1999) and two business-cycle trough 
                                                 
6 Because volatility before taxes may vary differentially across the distribution, in results not tabulated we calculated 
before-tax income volatility based on location in the initial year before-tax income distribution. There is strong 
evidence of increased trend volatility among the top 1%, but again it is swamped by the level of volatility at the 
bottom 1% and the 1st to 10th percentiles, and it more than doubled in the first decile. 
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years (1981 and 2009).7  The first column of the table depicts the total volatility, and here we see 
the dramatic increase in volatility across the distribution from 1981 to 2009, where it doubled or 
more for every group except the 10th to 25th percentile.  The remaining columns are the shares of 
the total volatility, and thus sum to 1 as in Tables 1 and 2.  The share of volatility owing to 
head’s earnings fell for every group over the period, except for the top 1%.  Piketty and Saez 
(2003) document the rise of labor earnings as a major reason for the rising inequality in the top 
1%, and our results here underscore the parallel rise in earnings volatility at the top. We also see 
that the share attributable to wife earnings fell in the bottom half of the distribution, but 
increased in the top half.  Across the distribution, other nonlabor income volatility and tax 
payment volatility each fell as a share of the total, while transfer income volatility rose for all 
groups except the very top.  In terms of the covariances, notable is the increased smoothing 
offered by transfers to changes in head earnings, especially in the middle of the distribution in 
the depth of the Great Recession, and by the increased negative covariance of other non-transfer 
income and head earnings in the top half of the income distribution.  The decreased share of 
volatility from the covariance of the tax code with head earnings and with other income is offset 
to some extent by the increased share (in absolute value) between spousal earnings and tax 
payments.  The trend toward more positive covariance of earnings shocks among spouses 
earnings appears most strong in the bottom 90 percent of the distribution, potentially exposing 
the middle class to less income insurance through assortative matching. 
 
VI. Income Volatility and Income Cyclicality 
 Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen (2009, 2010) find that the rise in income inequality at the 
top of the distribution is associated with a rise in the cyclicality of incomes at the top.  As 
                                                 
7 Figures containing annual estimates are available from the authors upon request. 
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reported above we find that the volatility of incomes increased fastest at the top of the 
distribution.  Our focus is more on trend volatility, and not the cyclicality of incomes per se.  
However, with two-year percent changes it is clear that our measure of volatility captures aspects 
of the overall business cycle, and thus in this section we report the results of regression models 
akin to those in Parker and Vissing-Jorgenson.  Specifically, for each income group i in the CPS 
we estimate models of the form  
(7) ∆ln	 y 	 ∆ ln , 
where ∆ln	 y  denotes the 1 year change in log disposable per capita family income and NIPA 
represents the 1 year change in log NIPA income. The ‘beta’ coefficient reflects the elasticity of 
per capita income with respect to changes in aggregate income, i.e. the cyclicality of income.8 
These results are independently of interest because Parker and Vissing-Jorgenson focused on the 
top of the income distribution since they used the tax return data in Piketty and Saez (2003), 
whereas with our CPS data we better capture the low end of the income distribution. 
[Table 4 here] 
We present the results of the regression models in Table 4.  The beta coefficients range 
between 0.418 and 0.649 within percentiles 10 and 99, but there is no clear monotonic pattern 
across these groups. The highest degree of cyclicality occurs at the very top of the income 
distribution.  The estimate of 2.97 says that for a 1 percent increase in NIPA income, income 
among persons in the top 1% increase 2.97.   We do find a very large estimate of 6.15 among the 
bottom 1%, but it is not statistically different from zero, and the estimate for the 1st-10th 
percentiles is a small and insignificant 0.097.  In results not tabulated we also re-estimated 
equation (7) where instead of using NIPA income we used aggregate consumption as the 
                                                 
8 Note that the change in log income for the dependent variable is approximately equal to the point percent change. 
This differs from our earlier analysis of arc percent changes, the latter of which use mean income in the denominator 
rather than initial period income. 
 19
measure of the business cycle.  Here again we find statistically zero effects at the bottom of the 
distribution, and large positive effects at the top.  These results corroborate those of Parker and 
Vissing-Jorgenson.  The relatively muted response at the bottom of the distribution likely owes 
to the greater reliance on transfer income (e.g. cash welfare, disability insurance), which is 
perhaps less responsive than labor market income, which accounts for the bulk of income at the 
top.   
 
VII. Conclusion 
Our results indicate that the variance of income changes more than doubled since 1980, 
and this increased volatility cuts across race, family structure, and the income distribution.  The 
analysis corroborates that reported in Frank (2011) and Parker and Vissing-Jorgenson (2009) that 
the rich have experienced a dramatic secular increase in volatility in recent decades, but on most 
counts the level of volatility is lower at the top than at the bottom, and importantly volatility at 
the top is around a mean pre-tax income of $500,000 over the past decade as opposed to a mean 
pre-tax income of under $10,000 at the bottom 10th percentile.  Families at both ends of the 
income distribution have experienced the “wild ride” of income volatility.   
The increase in volatility came from increased volatility of all major income sources—
husband and wife earnings, transfer income, other non-transfer income, as well as tax payments.  
Moreover, in recent years the covariance of spousal earnings volatilities has become positive, 
suggesting that husbands and wives now have positively correlated earnings shocks and thus 
making it more difficult to smooth family income volatility.  Likewise, the tax code seems to be 
less negatively correlated with earnings, providing less implicit insurance to the family.  In the 
absence of the increased negative covariance between the volatility of head earnings with other 
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income, and to a lesser extent with transfer income in the middle of the distribution, overall 
volatility would be much higher.   
 These results suggest that there has been a shift in risk toward the family and away from 
public policies.  However, with positively correlated earnings shocks, the family is less able to 
self insure through the labor market, but instead has come to rely on other forms of nonlabor 
income to absorb volatility in the labor market.  The expansion of the safety net as part of the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 seemed to slow down, or even reverse, some 
of these trends, but with the temporary provisions expiring, the experience of the past decades 
suggests that families will continue to have to find mechanisms to self insure against volatility.  
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Figure 1:  Trends in Disposable Income Volatility 
All Families
All Families - Positives Only
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Gains
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Figure 2: Trends in Disposable Income Volatility by Race and 
Family Structure
All Families Married Families Female Headed
Black Families White Families
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Figure 3.  Trends in Variance Components of Disposable 
Income Volatility
V(total) V(head wages) V(spouse wages)
V(other) V(transfers) V(taxes)
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Figure 4.  Trends in Covariance Components of Disposable 
Income Volatility
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Figure 5. Trends in Disposable Income Volatility by Location 
in Initial Year Disposable Income Distribution
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 Table 1. Total Variance and Share of Family Income Volatility Decomposition by Component, All Families 
Year Total 
Var 
Var 
(head 
wages) 
Var 
(spouse 
wages) 
Var 
(other) 
Var 
(trans) 
Var 
(taxes) 
Cov 
(head, 
spouse) 
Cov 
(head, 
other) 
Cov 
(head, 
trans) 
Cov 
(head, 
taxes) 
Cov 
(spouse, 
other) 
Cov 
(spouse, 
trans) 
Cov 
(spouse, 
taxes) 
Cov 
(other, 
trans) 
Cov 
(other, 
taxes) 
Cov 
(trans, 
taxes) 
1981 0.12 0.90 0.44 0.70 0.16 0.21 0.00 -0.11 -0.02 -0.55 -0.17 -0.03 -0.20 -0.03 -0.30 0.01 
1986 0.14 0.89 0.43 0.60 0.18 0.17 0.00 -0.12 -0.04 -0.52 -0.09 -0.04 -0.21 -0.03 -0.23 0.01 
1989 0.17 0.88 0.43 0.51 0.13 0.14 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 -0.50 -0.06 -0.04 -0.20 -0.02 -0.20 0.01 
1993 0.19 0.90 0.46 0.48 0.17 0.14 0.01 -0.05 -0.09 -0.51 -0.09 -0.05 -0.21 -0.02 -0.16 0.02 
1997 0.22 0.87 0.44 0.55 0.14 0.16 0.02 -0.14 -0.03 -0.51 -0.07 -0.03 -0.23 -0.01 -0.18 0.00 
2001 0.26 0.93 0.51 0.60 0.13 0.18 0.01 -0.21 -0.03 -0.54 -0.08 -0.02 -0.28 -0.01 -0.22 0.00 
2005 0.26 0.83 0.38 0.61 0.15 0.12 0.00 -0.25 -0.02 -0.39 -0.07 -0.02 -0.16 -0.02 -0.17 0.00 
2009 0.25 0.81 0.39 0.52 0.20 0.12 0.02 -0.20 -0.07 -0.38 -0.06 -0.04 -0.18 -0.01 -0.13 0.01 
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 Table 2. Total Variance and Share of Family Income Volatility Decomposition by Component, All Married Families 
Year Total 
Var 
Var 
(head 
wages) 
Var 
(spouse 
wages) 
Var 
(other) 
Var 
(trans) 
Var 
(taxes) 
Cov 
(head, 
spouse) 
Cov 
(head, 
other) 
Cov 
(head, 
trans) 
Cov 
(head, 
taxes) 
Cov 
(spouse, 
other) 
Cov 
(spouse, 
trans) 
Cov 
(spouse, 
taxes) 
Cov 
(other, 
trans) 
Cov 
(other, 
taxes) 
Cov 
(trans, 
taxes) 
1981 0.08 1.46 0.45 0.81 0.08 0.29 -0.03 -0.22 -0.05 -0.91 -0.31 -0.02 -0.19 -0.02 -0.36 0.01 
1986 0.10 1.34 0.40 0.68 0.07 0.23 -0.03 -0.20 -0.05 -0.79 -0.18 -0.01 -0.19 -0.02 -0.27 0.01 
1989 0.13 1.14 0.37 0.55 0.06 0.16 0.01 -0.07 -0.05 -0.65 -0.12 -0.01 -0.18 -0.01 -0.22 0.01 
1993 0.14 1.16 0.39 0.55 0.06 0.17 0.01 -0.05 -0.06 -0.66 -0.13 -0.02 -0.19 0.00 -0.22 0.01 
1997 0.16 1.17 0.39 0.56 0.10 0.17 0.02 -0.10 -0.08 -0.67 -0.16 -0.02 -0.18 -0.01 -0.19 0.01 
2001 0.21 1.22 0.40 0.70 0.09 0.20 0.04 -0.27 -0.04 -0.70 -0.16 -0.01 -0.22 -0.01 -0.24 0.00 
2005 0.18 1.32 0.45 0.79 0.08 0.23 0.03 -0.43 -0.03 -0.75 -0.15 0.00 -0.27 -0.01 -0.26 0.00 
2009 0.18 1.25 0.37 0.93 0.08 0.16 0.01 -0.58 -0.03 -0.57 -0.19 0.00 -0.16 -0.02 -0.25 0.00 
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 Table 3. Total Variance and Share of Family Income Volatility Decomposition by Component and Income Group 
Year Total 
Var 
Var 
(head 
wages) 
Var 
(spouse 
wages) 
Var 
(other) 
Var 
(trans) 
Var 
(taxes) 
Cov 
(head, 
spouse) 
Cov 
(head, 
other) 
Cov 
(head, 
trans) 
Cov 
(head, 
taxes) 
Cov 
(spouse, 
other) 
Cov 
(spouse, 
trans) 
Cov 
(spouse, 
taxes) 
Cov 
(other, 
trans) 
Cov 
(other, 
taxes) 
Cov 
(trans, 
taxes) 
  
Bottom 1% of Initial Year After-Tax Income Distribution 
1981 1.15 0.54 0.32 0.58 0.41 0.08 -0.08 -0.17 -0.16 -0.19 -0.14 -0.06 -0.07 -0.08 -0.03 0.04 
1989 0.89 0.73 0.45 0.56 0.42 0.05 -0.13 -0.14 -0.13 -0.27 -0.14 -0.22 -0.04 -0.14 -0.05 0.06 
1999 1.39 0.63 0.41 0.64 0.40 0.06 -0.20 -0.20 -0.15 -0.16 -0.14 -0.11 -0.06 -0.10 -0.04 0.03 
2009 1.71 0.26 0.20 0.46 0.52 0.05 -0.04 -0.06 -0.08 -0.08 -0.02 -0.08 -0.06 -0.05 -0.02 0.02 
                 
 1-10% of Initial Year After-Tax Income Distribution 
1981 0.28 0.49 0.46 0.41 0.32 0.06 0.04 -0.09 -0.04 -0.22 -0.08 -0.07 -0.17 -0.06 -0.05 0.01 
1989 0.31 0.76 0.45 0.35 0.34 0.08 0.01 -0.09 -0.11 -0.33 0.00 -0.15 -0.16 -0.11 -0.06 0.03 
1999 0.46 0.59 0.42 0.31 0.31 0.07 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.26 -0.02 -0.08 -0.14 -0.02 -0.07 0.01 
2009 0.55 0.44 0.24 0.30 0.39 0.05 0.00 -0.03 -0.08 -0.15 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 
                 
 10-25% of Initial Year After-Tax Income Distribution 
1981 0.15 0.84 0.46 0.64 0.14 0.15 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.41 -0.08 -0.09 -0.22 -0.06 -0.29 0.02 
1989 0.18 0.87 0.51 0.48 0.18 0.11 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.45 -0.14 -0.07 -0.20 -0.03 -0.12 0.01 
1999 0.23 0.64 0.50 0.56 0.16 0.11 -0.01 -0.09 -0.05 -0.30 -0.10 -0.05 -0.21 0.00 -0.16 0.00 
2009 0.26 0.67 0.39 0.45 0.26 0.09 0.01 -0.05 -0.14 -0.28 -0.02 -0.14 -0.14 -0.04 -0.10 0.03 
                 
 25-50% of Initial Year After-Tax Income Distribution 
1981 0.08 1.28 0.53 0.76 0.09 0.23 -0.04 -0.27 -0.04 -0.77 -0.22 -0.03 -0.26 -0.03 -0.25 0.02 
1989 0.13 0.95 0.50 0.58 0.05 0.15 -0.05 -0.09 -0.05 -0.52 -0.07 -0.01 -0.25 0.01 -0.21 0.01 
1999 0.17 0.98 0.49 0.63 0.07 0.16 0.00 -0.18 -0.06 -0.53 -0.09 -0.03 -0.25 -0.01 -0.22 0.02 
2009 0.19 0.96 0.55 0.53 0.12 0.13 0.02 -0.22 -0.14 -0.43 -0.07 -0.05 -0.26 -0.02 -0.14 0.03 
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 Table 3 Continued 
Year Var 
(Total) 
Var 
(head 
wages) 
Var 
(spouse 
wages) 
Var 
(other) 
Var 
(trans) 
Var 
(taxes) 
Cov 
(head, 
spouse) 
Cov 
(head, 
other) 
Cov 
(head, 
trans) 
Cov 
(head, 
taxes) 
Cov 
(spouse, 
other) 
Cov 
(spouse, 
trans) 
Cov 
(spouse, 
taxes) 
Cov 
(other, 
trans) 
Cov 
(other, 
taxes) 
Cov 
(trans, 
taxes) 
  
50-75% of Initial Year After-Tax Income Distribution 
1981 0.06 1.36 0.64 1.12 0.06 0.33 -0.06 -0.30 -0.04 -0.89 -0.44 0.00 -0.30 0.00 -0.46 0.01 
1989 0.09 1.11 0.51 0.62 0.04 0.21 0.01 -0.05 -0.06 -0.68 -0.13 -0.02 -0.29 0.01 -0.29 0.02 
1999 0.13 1.18 0.56 0.87 0.06 0.21 -0.07 -0.37 -0.03 -0.64 -0.18 -0.02 -0.28 -0.01 -0.29 0.01 
2009 0.14 1.27 0.52 0.90 0.08 0.18 0.01 -0.51 -0.13 -0.61 -0.19 -0.05 -0.27 0.00 -0.25 0.03 
                 
 75-90% of Initial Year After-Tax Income Distribution 
1981 0.05 1.30 0.57 1.31 0.03 0.44 -0.09 -0.10 0.00 -1.00 -0.45 0.00 -0.24 0.00 -0.79 0.00 
1989 0.10 1.17 0.54 0.75 0.02 0.21 -0.06 -0.14 -0.03 -0.69 -0.22 0.00 -0.26 0.02 -0.31 0.00 
1999 0.12 1.08 0.57 1.20 0.05 0.27 0.06 -0.40 -0.01 -0.66 -0.31 0.00 -0.31 -0.02 -0.51 -0.01 
2009 0.13 1.26 0.51 0.96 0.08 0.20 -0.01 -0.57 -0.05 -0.62 -0.15 -0.04 -0.28 0.02 -0.30 -0.01 
                 
 90-99% of Initial Year After-Tax Income Distribution 
1981 0.05 2.09 0.55 1.54 0.01 0.83 0.09 -0.31 0.00 -1.95 -0.52 0.00 -0.34 0.00 -0.99 0.00 
1989 0.14 1.28 0.36 0.73 0.01 0.25 -0.04 -0.09 -0.01 -0.83 -0.02 0.00 -0.21 0.00 -0.41 0.00 
1999 0.18 1.18 0.47 0.99 0.01 0.30 -0.03 -0.17 0.00 -0.82 -0.15 0.00 -0.27 0.01 -0.51 0.00 
2009 0.16 1.49 0.62 0.85 0.02 0.26 0.03 -0.63 -0.02 -0.85 -0.13 -0.01 -0.38 -0.01 -0.25 0.01 
                 
 Top 1% of Initial Year After-Tax Income Distribution 
1981 0.15 2.08 0.22 2.05 0.00 0.82 -0.27 -0.56 -0.02 -1.49 -0.20 0.00 0.02 0.00 -1.67 0.01 
1989 0.30 1.32 0.24 0.95 0.00 0.25 0.04 -0.30 0.01 -0.82 -0.07 0.00 -0.15 -0.03 -0.45 0.01 
1999 0.36 2.60 0.60 0.88 0.00 0.46 -0.57 -0.80 -0.02 -1.51 0.02 0.00 -0.29 0.00 -0.39 0.01 
2009 0.41 2.16 0.83 0.59 0.00 0.33 -0.62 -0.59 0.01 -1.14 0.05 -0.02 -0.37 0.00 -0.23 0.00 
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Table 4. Income Cyclicality Models using NIPA Chain-Weighted Per Capita Aggregate Income 
∆(log Per Capita Disposable CPS Income) Bottom 1% 1-10% 10-25% 25-50% 
     
∆(log Aggregate NIPA Income) 6.151 0.097 0.418** 0.626*** 
 (3.984) (0.378) (0.205) (0.127) 
     
Observations 1,542 20,119 33,776 56,441 
R-squared 0.0015 0.0000 0.0001 0.0004 
 
∆(log Per Capita Disposable CPS Income) 50-75% 75-90% 90-99% Top 1% 
     
∆(log Aggregate NIPA Income) 0.393*** 0.430*** 0.649*** 2.973*** 
 (0.106) (0.128) (0.216) (1.018) 
     
Observations 56,495 33,900 20,352 2,247 
R-squared 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0038 
Note: Log aggregate NIPA income is measured as personal per capita income excluding current transfer receipts in chained 2005 
dollars from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA).  
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Appendix Table 1: Number and Rate of Merges by 2nd Year of CPS. CY 1981-2009 
Year 
# Merged CPS 
Observations 
# CPS 
Observations 
Merge Rate  
1981 14,353 26,300 54.57%  
1982 15,825 27,478 57.59%  
1983 15,742 27,302 57.66%  
1984 14,702 27,095 54.26%  
1985     
1986 15,162 27,208 55.73%  
1987 16,752 32,020 52.32%  
1988 18,222 29,985 60.77%  
1989 18,619 32,732 56.88%  
1990 20,102 33,471 60.06%  
1991 19,854 32,981 60.20%  
1992 19,678 32,360 60.81%  
1993 14,329 32,830 43.65%  
1994 12,560 30,303 41.45%  
1995     
1996 15,119 25,820 58.56%  
1997 14,864 25,305 58.74%  
1998 13,970 24,248 57.61%  
1999 13,205 27,372 48.24%  
2000 12,575 38,388 32.76%  
2001 15,009 38,805 38.68%  
2002 14,790 38,766 38.15%  
2003 15,478 38,473 40.23%  
2004 13,113 37,795 34.70%  
2005 14,092 37,754 37.33%  
2006 14,924 38,019 39.25%  
2007 15,104 37,871 39.88%  
2008 15,421 38,911 39.63%  
2009 15,951 39,196 40.70%  
 
Average #  
of Matches 
 
14,466 
 
Average % 
Matched 
 
48.90% 
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Appendix Table 2. Summary Statistics by 2nd Year  
Variables Mean Standard Deviation 
 
Pre-Tax Income 
 
All Families ($) 
   Arc % Change  
White Families ($) 
   Arc % Change  
Black Families ($) 
   Arc % Change 
Female-Headed Families ($) 
   Arc % Change  
 
Disposable Income 
    
All Families ($) 
   Arc % Change  
White Families ($) 
   Arc % Change  
Black Families ($) 
   Arc % Change 
Female-Headed Families ($) 
   Arc % Change  
 
 
Demographics 
 
   Age 
   % Female 
   No. of Persons in Family 
   % Less Than High School  
   % High School 
   % More Than High School 
   % White 
   % Black 
   % Other 
   % Married 
 
Number of Observations = 238,275 
 
 
 
70,817 
0.015 
83,442 
0.012 
65,839 
-0.003 
37,053 
0.012 
 
 
 
54,345 
0.017 
63,833 
0.015 
52,286 
0.001 
30,299 
0.011 
 
 
 
 
42 
54 
3.1 
14 
36 
50 
86 
9 
5 
72 
  
 
 
 
58,875 
0.508 
61,488 
0.429 
46,927 
0.504 
32,878 
0.585 
 
 
 
37,964 
0.448 
39,110 
0.374 
30,855 
0.441 
21,698 
0.515 
 
 
 
 
9.5 
49.8 
1.5 
34.3 
47.8 
49.4 
34.5 
28.7 
21.3 
44.7  
 
 
Note: Income data are adjusted for inflation using the 2009 personal consumption expenditure deflator 
 
 
